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Public Enemy: The Public 
Element of Direct and Public 
Incitement to Commit Genocide 
Brendan Saslow* 
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide has been 
an international crime since the 1940s. The public element plays 
a role in each international incitement case, yet many scholars 
consider it straightforward and unworthy of attention. This 
article seeks to analyze jurisprudence, primarily developed at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, on how to 
determine whether inciting to commit genocide is public. This 
element is most problematic in cases involving speech through 
broadcast media such as television and radio. Moreover if ICTR 
case law informs future international criminal proceedings it 
may be an issue in a future genocide that involves the Internet 
and social media. This Article ultimately concludes with several 
suggestions on how factors for finding whether speech is public 
or private should evolve in order to account for modern forms of 
communication.   
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“Public incitement occurs only if the appeal is likely to be heard 
by a large, undefined audience.”1 
Imagine a depraved government official issuing a message via 
Twitter. The message contains a veiled order to thousands of citizens 
to violently attack a minority group. The citizens lash out and 
slaughter the group nearly to extinction, as performed in genocides 
throughout history. To hold the provocateur liable, a law must 
predictably consider when speech constitutes a crime. 
Incitement to commit genocide is a notoriously problematic 
international crime.2 Susan Benesch, founder of the Dangerous Speech 
Project and professor at American University, explains that it is 
critical to clearly define it.3 Distinguished Chair of Human Rights at 
the University of Connecticut, Richard Wilson has approached 
incitement by clarifying causation.4 Meanwhile, international criminal 
bodies continue to develop speech crimes.5 Despite attempts to clarify 
incitement to genocide, defendants have exploited the public element 
with varying degrees of success.6 This element may also expand the 
 
1. Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khaled Ghanayim, Incitement, Not Sedition, 
in Freedom of Speech and Incitement Against Democracy 147, 160 
(David Kretzmer & Francine Kershman Hazan eds., 2000). 
2. See Richard Wilson, Inciting Genocides with Words, 36 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 277, 293 (2015) (“It is fair to say [incitement to commit genocide] has 
been one of the most controversial areas of international criminal law in 
the last twenty years.”). 
3. Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to 
Genocide, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 487 (2008) (“It is critical to define 
[incitement to commit genocide] properly.”). 
4. Wilson, supra note 2, at 281 (“This Article examines the framework of 
criminal accountability for direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide and critically evaluates the claim made in ICTR Trial 
Chamber judgments that a causal connection exists between 
propagandistic speech acts and genocidal acts of violence.”). 
5. Wilson, supra note 2, at 280 (“[I]nternational criminal courts have 
increasingly targeted public speech that incites inter-group violence. . . 
[a]s international tribunals target speech crimes with ever more 
alacrity”). 
6. See Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Appeals 
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement, ¶ 152 (Oct. 20, 2010) 
(Kalimanzira asserts that the Tribunal’s jurisprudence requires a very 
large number of individuals to be exposed to a call to commit genocide 
before it can be qualified as direct and public incitement.”); see also 
Augustin Ngirabatware v. Prosecutor (Ngirabatware Appeals 
Judgement), MICT-12-29-A, Judgment, ¶ 50 (Dec. 18, 2014) 
(“[Ngirabatware] submits that: (i) the mere presence of a group at the 
vicinity of the roadblock does not suffice to show that the alleged 
inciting statements were received by the public as, at best, the 
statements were heard by only three persons; and (ii) the group was 
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application of international incitement by extending its application to 
virtual communications, like email and social media. 
Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (the “Genocide Convention”) and the Statutes of 
the Rwanda and Yugoslavia Tribunals, direct and public incitement is 
a separate crime from genocide.7 In each of these three instruments, 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide exists in a list that 
includes genocide and four distinct crimes (conspiracy, incitement, 
attempt, and complicity).8 While all four relate to genocide, listing 
each in its own independent section allows ad hoc tribunals to convict 
defendants for actions that implicate genocide without actually 
convicting a defendant of genocide proper.9 This is helpful because 
genocide is particularly difficult to prove.10 
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide is established in 
Article III(c) of the Genocide Convention,11 Article II(3)(c) of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) statute,12 Article 
IV(3)(c) of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) statute,13 and Article 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).14 In the international criminal  
selected and limited to the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi manning 
the roadblock.”). 
7. Thomas Davies, Note, How the Rome Statute Weakens the International 
Prohibition on Incitement to Genocide, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245, 268 
(2009) (“The Genocide Convention . . . treats incitement to genocide as 
a separate crime. . . . The ICTY and ICTR Statutes follow the Genocide 
Convention.”). 
8. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, art. III(a)–(e), Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S 277 
[hereinafter Genocide Convention]; S.C. Res. 955, Annex art. 2(3) U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 25704, Annex art. 4(3) U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/25704 (May 25, 1993). 
9. See Davies, supra note 7, at 257 (“The fact that incitement is a crime in 
itself under the Genocide Convention and the tribunal statutes also 
means that a person can be prosecuted for incitement when no genocide 
has (yet) occurred.”). 
10. Harry de Quetteville, How do you prove genocide?, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 
17, 2008), 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/harrydequetteville/5474057/How_do
_you_prove_genocide/ [perma.cc/W7VW-9TBD ] (“Genocide has 
become one of the hardest charges to prove”).  
11. Genocide Convention, article III(a)-(e), Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 
U.N.T.S 277. 
12. S.C. Res. 955, Annex art. 2(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
13. S.C. Res. 25704, Annex art. 4(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/25704 (May 25, 
1993). 
14. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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context, the ICTR remains the only international criminal tribunal 
that has ever indicted an individual for the crime. Neither the ICC15 
nor ICTY16 has had occasion to contribute to the crime’s case law. 
The public element is noteworthy for its covert power to undermine 
rulings of incitement to genocide. In some cases judgments only give 
it lip service, whereas, in more recent cases, it has led to acquittals.17 
A beneficial approach would distill a method to consistently and 
efficiently decide whether incitement to commit genocide is public. 
This note attempts to capture the developing complexity of the 
public element. It argues that the select and limited factor is more 
appropriately characterized as a defense. The place factor must be 
appropriately defined and the medium factor should ascend to a more 
dominant role of the legal analysis.18 This new structure will help 
future courts evaluate the public element given modern virtual forms 
of communication. Part I begins by summarizing the development of 
the public element, emphasizing the purposes for including it in the 
Genocide Convention and the contemporary legal framework 
developed at the ICTR. Next, part II recommends that future 
decisions approach the select and limited factor as a defense and 
clarify the public and medium factors. Part III then considers how 
future rulings should develop the public element in regard to email 
and social networking platforms. Finally, part IV offers concluding 
remarks. 
I. Nuremburg To Arusha: The Jurisprudence Of Public 
Incitement To Commit Genocide 
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide is an inchoate 
crime.19 Genocide does not ever have to occur for a defendant to be 
convicted.20 To make a conviction, a criminal chamber must find the 
 
15. Davies, supra note 7, at 248 n.11 (“[N]o incitement cases have yet been 
litigated at the ICC”). 
16. WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF 
CRIMES 326 (2d ed. 2009) (“There have been no indictments by the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia for direct and public incitement to commit genocide.”). 
17. E.g., Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Appeals 
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement (Oct. 20, 2010). 
18. See infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
19. GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD HOC 
TRIBUNALS 256 (2005) (“‘Direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide’ is an inchoate offence . . . the Prosecution need not show . . . 
that anyone acted upon the act of incitement . . . nor that it produced 
any other result.”).  
20. See Davies, supra note 7, at 257 (“The fact that incitement is a crime in 
itself under the Genocide Convention and the tribunal statutes also 
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accused (1) intended to perpetrate direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide, and (2) perpetrated action that constitutes direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide.21 Genocidal intent is 
assumed to be present when a judge finds intent to commit direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide.22 Directness and publicness are 
elements of genocidal incitement.23 The public element requires a 
finding that both the actus reus was public and the accused had the 
mens rea to perpetrate incitement to genocide that was public.24 This 
element does not fit squarely within the traditional elements of a 
crime (actus reus and mens rea).25   
Throughout its history scholars have treated the public element 
as straightforward.26 Still, as an element, if a court does not find that 
 
means that a person can be prosecuted for incitement when no genocide 
has (yet) occurred.”). 
21. See SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 319 (“It is sufficient to establish that 
direct and public incitement took place, that the direct and public 
incitement was intentional, and that it was carried out with the intent 
to destroy in whole or in part a protected group as such.”); see also 
Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Trial 
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, Judgement, ¶ 510 (June 22, 
2009); Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Appeals 
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, Judgement, ¶ 121 (Sept. 29, 
2014). 
22. SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 326 (“To be convicted of direct and public 
incitement, it must be established that the perpetrator had a genocidal 
intent.”). Genocidal intent is considered a dolus specialis or special 
intent. Special intent as applied to genocide requires that “[t]he acts . . . 
must be done with intent to destroy the group as such in whole or in 
part.” Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. and Herz. 
v. Serb. and Montenegro) 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 187 (Feb. 26). Professor 
William Schabas points out that no individual could “plausibly be 
responsible for destroying a group in whole or in part.” SCHABAS, supra 
note 16, at 280. Genocidal intent is a high burden due to the fact that 
“genocide is an organized and not a spontaneous crime.” SCHABAS, supra 
note 16, at 246. 
23. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Akayesu English Trial Judgement), 
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 556–57 (Sept. 2, 1998) (“The 
public element of incitement to commit genocide may be better 
appreciated in light of two factors . . . . The ‘direct’ element of 
incitement implies that the incitement assume a direct form”). 
24. Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR98-44D-A, ¶ 129 (“the 
Appeals Chamber notes that establishing the public element requires 
not only that the accused publicly incited (actus reus), but also that the 
accused had the intent to incite publicly (mens rea)”). 
25. Id. 
26. See ROBERT CRYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW AND PROCEDURE 315 (2007) (“So far, determining what is public 
has not been too difficult.”); see also SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 329 
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incitement was public, then it cannot convict a defendant.27 
Interestingly, defendants cannot be convicted for inciting genocide in 
private.28 If a superior incites his or her subordinates to commit 
genocide, that conversation is likely to be considered private.29 The 
drafters of the Genocide Convention chose this method to limit the 
inchoate breadth of incitement to genocide.30 The modern definition of 
“public” relies on civil law formulations and the International Law 
Commission’s 1996 definition. Under the ILC definition, “public 
incitement is characterized by a call for criminal action to a number 
of individuals in a public place or to members of the general public at 
large by such means as the mass media.”31 In other words, incitement  
(“The word ‘public’ is the less difficult [element of incitement] to 
interpret.”). 
27. E.g., Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Appeals 
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement, ¶ 163, 165 (Oct. 20, 
2010) (“The Appeals Chamber, however, is not satisfied that the 
evidence reasonably supports the Trial Chamber’s findings concerning 
Kalimanzira’s intent to incite anyone other than those manning the 
Kajyanama roadblock. . . . Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber grants 
Kalimanzira’s Eighth and Ninth Grounds of Appeal and reverses the 
convictions for direct and public incitement based on the events at the 
Jaguar and Kajyanama roadblocks.”). But see, SCHABAS, supra note 16, 
at 319 (“incitement in private is subsumed within the act of complicity, 
listed in Article III(e) [of the Genocide Convention]. Incitement in 
private is punishable only if the underlying crime of genocide occurs, 
whereas incitement in public can be prosecuted even where genocide 
does not take place. . . . incitement, if successful, becomes a form of 
complicity covered by paragraph (e)”). 
28. Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, ¶ 
126(“The Appeals Chamber notes that . . . public incitement was 
understood as ‘public speeches or in the press, through the radio, the 
cinema or other ways of reaching the public,’ . . . it expressly excluded 
‘private’ incitement.”). 
29. Kalimanzira English Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, n.414 
(“The . . . definition adopted by the Sixth Committee . . . differentiated 
acts such as instructions from officials to subordinates or heads of 
organizations to members from ‘direct public incitement.’”). 
30. SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 321–23 (“In the Sixth Committee, the 
United States . . . contest[ed] entirely any reference to incitement as an 
inchoate offence. . . . Poland insisted that prevention was also the goal 
of the convention . . . . Belgium urged a ‘happy compromise’, deleting 
the phrase ‘or in private’. . . . The Committee voted to delete the words 
‘or in private’.”). 
31. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Akayesu English Trial Judgement), 
ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 556 n. 126 (Sept. 2, 1998). The International 
Law Commission was created by the United Nations General Assembly 
in 1947. Its purpose is to “promote the progressive development of 
international law and its codification.” INT’L L. COMM’N, 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/work.shtml [https://perma.cc/RM8S-YGMR] 
(last visited July 29, 2015). 
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is public when a perpetrator incites genocide in a public place, public 
by definition, or to the general public by radio or television.32 It took 
60 years for the international community to develop this modern 
formula. 
A. History of the Public Element Before the Genocide Convention 
Incitement to genocide dates to the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg, following the Holocaust.33 Prosecutors 
accused German defendants Julius Streicher and Hans Fritzsche of 
speech crimes, at the time categorized as a crime against humanity.34 
Streicher, editor of the anti-Semitic publication Der Stürmer,35 was 
convicted of “incitement to murder and extermination” for 
“persecution on political and racial grounds.”36 He was the only IMT 
defendant executed exclusively for crimes against humanity.37 
Fritzsche was a senior Nazi official and radio announcer known for his 
 
32. Examples of methods for conveying speech to the general public include 
“speeches, shouting or threats uttered in public places or at public 
gatherings, or through the sale or dissemination, offer for sale or display 
of written material or printed matter in public places or at public 
gatherings, or through the public display of placards or posters, or 
through any other means of audiovisual communication.” Akayesu 
English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 556, 
559 (Sept. 2, 1998); Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. 
ICTR98-44D-A, ¶ 122 (“The travaux preparatoires of the Genocide 
Convention confirm[] that ‘public’ incitement to genocide pertains to 
mass communications.”). 
33. Wibke Kristin Timmermann, Incitement in International Criminal Law, 
88 INT. REV. RED CROSS 823, 827 (2006) (“Incitement to genocide first 
became a crime under international law when the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg passed judgment on the accused Julius 
Streicher and Hans Fritzsche in 1946.”). 
34. Wilson, supra note 2, at 283 (“the prosecution held the two propaganda 
defendants—Streicher and Fritzsche—liable for crimes against humanity 
as accessories or abettors who incited and encouraged others.”). 
35. The English translation is ‘The attacker.’ Ronald Koven, Put Your Own 
House in Order First, 35 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 177 (2006) (“Nobody 
ever thought to allege that the Holocaust happened in World War II 
because of Nazi propaganda minister Josef Goebbels or Julius Streicher 
and his hate sheet Der Stürmer (The Attacker).”). Streicher infamously 
wrote “[t]he Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be exterminated 
root and branch.” International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg), 
Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 295 (1946) [hereinafter 
Nuremberg Decisions]. 
36. Nuremberg Decisions, supra note 35, at 296. 
37. Wilson, supra note 2, at 283 (“Streicher’s case was exceptional in that 
he was the only defendant convicted and executed at Nuremberg solely 
on Count Four of “Crimes Against Humanity.”).  
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radio program “Hans Fritzsche speaks.”38 He was acquitted.39 
Streicher, specifically, set the foundation for modern international 
criminal liability for incitement to commit genocide.40 
After the Nuremburg tribunal, the United Nations drafted the 
modern day Genocide Convention, defining genocide for the first 
time.41 Article III(c) sets “direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide” as an international crime.42 It was adopted into force, as 
part of the Genocide Convention, on January 12, 1951, after a lengthy 
drafting process.43 
In comments to the first draft, the Secretariat explained that 
“direct public incitement” did not encompass “orders or instructions 
by officials to their subordinates” or by “heads of an organization to 
its members.”44 The Secretariat also emphasized the importance of 
inchoate offenses in its initial draft.45 It referred to some as 
 
38. The prosecution argued that Fritzsche “incited and encouraged the 
commission of war crimes by deliberately falsifying news.” Wilson, supra 
note 2, at 328. Timmermann, supra note 33, at 828 (“Hans Fritzsche 
was a senior official in Goebbels’s Ministry of Popular Enlightenment 
and Propaganda as well as head of the ministry’s Radio Division from 
1942 onwards.”). 
39. Nuremberg Decisions, supra note 35, at 326.  
40. Wilson, supra note 2, at 283 (“In international criminal law, 
responsibility for propaganda and violent speech was first established in 
1945–46 at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg in 
the Streicher case.”). 
41. SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF 
GENOCIDE 29, 40–45, 54–60 (2007) (Citing a speech by Winston 
Churchill on August 24, 1941 stating “[w]e are in the presence of a crime 
without a name” and explaining Raphael Lemkin’s development of the 
term ‘genocide’ and its first legal definition in the Genocide 
Convention). 
42. Genocide Convention, supra note 8, at art. III(c). 
43. The process began with the creation of a Secretariat draft. Article 
II(II)(2) proposed that “direct public incitement to any act of genocide, 
whether incitement be successful or not” was a punishable international 
criminal offense. HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE GENOCIDE 
CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 216 (2009). Next, member 
states offered comments and amendments then the Economic and Social 
Counsel created an ad hoc committee to debate relevant issues. Finally, 
the Convention was adopted by the General Assembly. Id. at 644.  
44. Id. at 238. 
45. It offered two reasons. First, genocide is an exceptionally grave crime. 
Id. at 237 (“genocide is an extremely grave crime, the effects of which, 
once it has been committed, are irreparable”). Second genocide requires 
preparation and support from many individuals. Id. at 237 (“[genocide] 
is a crime that normally requires the support of a comparatively large 
number of individuals and substantial preparation.”). In addition 
inchoate crimes serve a preventive purpose, which was probably 
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“preparatory acts.” Strikingly, the Secretariat distinguished the 
inchoate offense of incitement,46 a crime that excluded inciting orders 
from superiors to subordinates.47 Instead, these crimes were eventually 
eliminated as types of preparatory acts, but incitement to genocide 
survived in its modern form.48 William Schabas, professor of 
international law and a preeminent genocide scholar, argues that 
defendants are liable for such orders under complicity in genocide, 
Article III(e).49 This context complicates charges and may lead to 
acquittals if prosecutors indict a defendant for incitement, rather than 
complicity. 
Debates over incitement, as an inchoate crime, were particularly 
fierce. The United States was concerned about limiting free speech. 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, felt that inchoate incitement 
 
important to fulfill the preventive function as indicated in the full title, 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. Genocide Convention, supra note 8. But see, Wilson, supra 
note 2, at 298 (“thus far, no defendant has been indicted for ICG in the 
absence of an actual genocide.”). 
46. ABTAHI, supra note 43, at 216 (organizing preparatory acts under 
Article II.I(2) and incitement under Article II.II(2)). See also Callixte 
Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Appeals Judgement), 
Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement, n.414 (Oct. 20, 2010) (“The 
proposal of the Secretariat differentiated acts such as instructions from 
officials to subordinates or heads of organizations to members from 
‘direct public incitement.’ . . . These acts were considered as 
‘preparatory acts’ and covered by other sections of the convention.”). 
47. Preparatory acts included “studies and research for the purpose of 
developing the technique of genocide; setting up of installations, 
manufacturing, obtaining, possessing or supplying of articles or 
substances with the knowledge that they are intended for genocide; 
issuing instructions or orders, and distributing tasks with a view to 
committing genocide.” ABTAHI, supra note 43, at 216. 
48. None of the preparatory acts were included in the modern genocide 
convention. See ABTAHI, supra note 43, at 216. See also Genocide 
Convention, supra note 8 (noting the absence).  
49. SCHABAS supra note 16, at 319; Genocide Convention, supra note 8. 
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was not potent enough.50 To strike a balance, the drafters attached 
the word “public,” thereby limiting the crime’s application.51  
In Ad Hoc Committee sessions, the Venezuelan delegation 
suggested adding the terms “publicly or privately.”52 The committee 
adopted these words on a vote of five delegates in favor and two 
abstaining, but the General Assembly Sixth Committee eventually 
eliminated the word “privately.” 53 Venezuela contested the change, 
asserting that incitement to genocide could occur in public and in 
private. It further alleged private incitement exclusively covered 
correspondence via letter and telephone.54 Venezuela’s pleas had little 
effect, as the crime was ultimately codified as direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide. 
B. How the Public Element Developed at the Rwanda Tribunal 
Beginning on April 6, 1994, approximately 800,000 Rwandans 
were slaughtered.55 Earlier that day dissidents shot the Rwandan 
 
50. The U.S. contested the Soviet approach in the General Assembly, feeling 
that such power could chill and criminalize free speech. See ABTAHI, 
supra note 43, at 697, 1527 (“If it were admitted that incitement were 
an act of genocide, any newspaper article criticizing a political group, for 
example, or suggesting certain measures with regard to such group for 
the general welfare, might make it possible for certain states to claim 
that a government which allowed the publication of such an article was 
committing an act of genocide; and yet that article might be nothing 
more than the mere exercise of the right of freedom of the press.”). 
51. SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 329 (“[The terms direct and public] were the 
technique by which the drafters meant to limit the scope of any offence 
of inchoate incitement.”). 
52. SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 321 (“Venezuela’s suggestion that ‘publicly 
or privately’ be added . . . was also accepted.”). Venezuela sought to 
expand incitement to the press and radio. SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 
321 (“According to Venezuela, the addition of ‘publicly or privately’ 
would obviate the need for further particulars, such as ‘press, radio, 
etc.”). 
53. SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 320 n.73 (“five in favor, with two 
abstentions”); SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 322 (“[S]everal delegations, 
while supporting the incitement provision, were concerned about the 
scope of the Ad Hoc Committee text. Belgium urged a ‘happy 
compromise,’ deleting the phrase ‘or in private’.”); SCHABAS, supra note 
16, at 323 (“The Committee voted to delete the word ‘or in private’.”); 
SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 323, n.91 (“[T]wenty-six in favour, six 
against, with ten abstentions”). 
54. ABTAHI, supra note 43, at 1521 (“Venezuela . . . . had serious objections 
however, to the deletion . . . of the words ‘or in private’ . . . . Incitement 
could be carried out in public, but it could also take place in private, 
through individual consultation, by letter or even by telephone. It was 
necessary to punish both forms of incitement.”). 
55. Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide, ATLANTIC (Sept. 1, 2001, 
12:00 PM) available at 
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President’s plane from the sky.56 His assassination was allegedly a 
Hutu plot to scapegoat the Tutsi minority and spark a powder keg of 
ethnic hatred.57 Soon after, neighbors wielding machetes, led by 
Rwandan officials, massacred people of all ages and genders.  
Mere hours after the president’s plane crashed, the Rwandan 
Armed forces and militia groups began setting up roadblocks 
throughout the country.58 The attendants at the roadblocks acted 
violently. Asking passersby for proof of ethnicity, they killed Tutsi 
and moderate Hutu civilians on the spot.59 Lasting just 100 days, the 
Rwanda genocide has been labeled the most efficient genocide of the 
twentieth century.60 
When the violence subsided, the Security Council passed 
resolution 955.61 The foundational document of the International 
 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-
genocide/304571/ [perma.cc/87DG-Q62E] (“Using firearms, machetes, 
and a variety of garden implements, Hutu militiamen, soldiers, and 
ordinary citizens murdered some 800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate 
Hutu.”). 
56. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE 
WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 110 (1999) (On the evening of 
April 6, 1996 . . . President Habyarimana’s plane . . . had been shot 
down over Kigali . . . . The new Hutu President of Burundi and several 
of Habyarimana’s top advisers had also been on board. There were no 
survivors.”). Juvenal Habyarimana, an ethnic Hutu, had fallen out of 
favor with radical members of his cabinet. Id. at 113 (“Habyarimana’s 
assassins have never been positively identified, suspicion has focused on 
the extremists in his own entourage”). 
57. Ethnic tensions in Rwanda date back to, and possibly precede, 
European colonization, first by Germany then Belgium, as a result of 
the Berlin Conference. See id. at 47–58.  
58. Amnesty International, Rwanda: Mass Murder by government 
supporters and troops in April and May 1994 2.1 (Apr. 30, 1994) 
(“Militia set up roadblocks in Kigali and its suburbs. . . . Evidence of 
similar coordinated action was to emerge countrywide in the weeks to 
come.”). 
59. Id. (“Each individual passing through these roadblocks had to produce 
an identity card which indicates the ethnic origin of its bearer. Being 
identified as or mistaken for a Tutsi meant immediate and summary 
execution. The killers made no attempt to conceal the killings—or hide 
the bodies after the fact, as witnessed by journalists and other foreign 
nationals. There was no evidence that either central government or local 
government authorities or senior army officers opposed the killings by 
those acting on their authority. Quite the contrary, the evidence 
suggests the de facto authorities and top armed forces leaders had 
ordered and directed even this early stage of the murder campaign.”). 
60. Power, supra note 55 (“[The Rwandan Genocide] was the fastest, most 
efficient killing spree of the twentieth century.”). 
61. S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
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Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which encouraged convictions 
of high profile individuals accused of orchestrating the genocide.62 The 
ICTR is particularly relevant to a discussion of incitement to genocide 
because it was the first international criminal body to impose the 
crime in its modern form.63 Since its first trial, in January 1998, the 
ICTR has indicted over fifteen individuals for incitement.64 Notably, 
the ICTR had considerable leeway to interpret the crime, as the U.N. 
Ad Hoc Drafting Committee never discussed the meaning of the 
words “public” and “direct.”65 The Tribunal, as a result, has produced 
the most developed body of jurisprudence on these elements. 
 
62. S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (The resolution 
was created for “the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for 
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible 
for genocide.”). 
63. Benesch, supra note 3, at 489 (“[T]he world’s first conviction for 
incitement to genocide [was] in the case of a former Rwandan 
bourgmestre [Jean-Paul Akayesu].”). 
64. Historic Judgement Finds Akayesu Guilty of Genocide, UNITED NATIONS 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (Sept. 2, 1998), 
http://www.unictr.org/en/news/historic-judgement-finds-akayesu-
guilty-genocide [perma.cc/3GKE-Z26H] (“[T]he International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, in the first-ever judgement by an international 
court for the crime of genocide, today found Jean-Paul Akayesu guilty 
of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity.”); see generally Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Akayesu English Trial Judgement), Case No. 
ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Jean 
Kambanda, Case No. ICTR97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence, (Sept. 4, 
1998); Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu (Ruggiu English Judgement), Case 
No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, (June 1, 2000); Prosecutor 
v. Joseph Serugendo, Case No. ICTR-2005-84-I, Judgement and 
Sentence, (June 12, 2006); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze 
(Nahimana Trial Judgement), Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and 
Sentence, (Dec. 3, 2003); Prosecutor v. Eliézer Niyitegeka, Case No. 
ICTR-96-14-T, Judgement and Sentence, (May 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. 
Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T, Judgement and 
Sentence, (Sept. 12, 2006); Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, Case No. 
ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgement and Sentence, (Dec. 1, 2003); Prosecutor v. 
Simon Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgement, (Dec. 2, 2008); 
Prosecutor v. Callixte Kalimanzira (Kalimanzira English Trial 
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, Judgement, (June 22, 2009); 
Prosecutor v. Callixte Nzabonimana (Nzabonimana Trial Judgement), 
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-T, Judgement and Sentence, (May 31, 2012); 
Prosecutor v. Augustin Ngirabatware, Case No. ICTR-99-54-T, 
Judgement and Sentence, (Dec. 20, 2012); Prosecutor v. 
Nyiramasuhuko, Ntahobali, Nsabimana, Nteziryayo, Kanyabashi 
Ndayambaje (Nyiramasuhuko Trial Judgement), Case No. ICTR-98-42-
T, Judgement and Sentence, (June 24, 2011).  
65. SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 321 (“At no point did the Committee 
discuss what ‘direct’ or ‘public’ might mean.”). 
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As the first international criminal body to approach an incitement 
to commit genocide indictment since the adoption of the Genocide 
Convention, the Akayesu Trial Chamber developed the basic 
framework. In the case of Jean-Paul Akayesu, Bourgemestre of Taba 
commune in central Rwanda, the Tribunal issued its first conviction 
for direct and public incitement to commit genocide.66 Early in the 
morning, approximately thirteen days after the President’s death, 
Akayesu urged a crowd of 100 to 200 Rwandans to “eliminate the sole 
enemy.”67 He knew the crowd understood that the enemy was the 
Tutsis.68 
In finding Akayesu’s speech “public,”69 the Court recognized two 
definitions and two relevant factors for deciding future cases.70 One 
definition derives from a civil law source.71 It states that “words [are] 
public where they are spoken aloud in a place that is public by 
definition.”72 The second definition, developed by the International 
 
66. Akayesu English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 674, 734. 
Benesch, supra note 3, at 489 (“[T]he world’s first conviction for 
incitement to genocide [was] in the case of a former Rwandan 
bourgmestre [Jean-Paul Akayesu].”). Akayesu was also the first person 
ever convicted of genocide. Benesch, supra note 3, at 512 (“In 
September 1998 the Tribunal convicted Akayesu . . . of genocide 
(making his case the first such conviction ever)”). 
67. Akayesu English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 326, 358-
62, 673 (“[A]t about 4 a.m., on the night of 18 to 19 April 1994, . . . 
.[Akayesu] immediately alerted the police and went to the scene . . . . In 
Gishyeshye, he found a body stretched out on the ground . . . . The 
Accused puts the crowd at the meeting at about 100 to 200 people . . . . 
The Accused admitted before the Chamber that he asked the crowd to 
draw closer, and then addressed the crowd . . . . the Chamber is 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused clearly called on 
the population to unite and eliminate the sole enemy: accomplices of the 
Inkotanyi.”). 
68. Id. at ¶ 709 (“Akayesu himself knew of the impact of his statements on 
the crowd and of the fact that his call to fight against the accomplices of 
the Inkotanyi would be understood as exhortations to kill the Tutsi in 
general.”). 
69. Id. at ¶ 674 (“[T]he Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that, by the above-mentioned speeches made in public and in a public 
place, Akayesu had the intent to directly create a particular state of 
mind in his audience necessary to lead to the destruction of the Tutsi 
group, as such.”). 
70. Id. at ¶ 556.  
71. See infra Part I.B.1. 
72. Akayesu English Trial Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 556 (“A line of 
authority commonly followed in Civil law systems would regard words 
as being public where they were spoken aloud in a place that were 
public by definition.”).  
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Law Commission (ILC), expands upon the first.73 It incorporates 
statements conveyed to the general public through the mass media.74 
This second definition, importantly, draws in the Genocide 
Convention drafting committee’s intent to punish incitement through 
mass media.75 
The two “primary” factors, also set forth by the Akayesu Court, 
are crucial to the modern analysis.76 The first factor is “the place 
where the incitement occurred” (the “place” factor).77 The second 
factor is “whether or not an audience is select or limited” (the “select 
or/and limited” factor).78 A finding that an audience is select and 
limited implies that an audience to the incitement was private, not 
public, and therefore the defendant may not be convicted of 
incitement.79 Later judgments adjoin two more factors to decide 
whether an audience is select and limited. These factors include the 
 
73. International Law Commission, Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the 
Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, May 6 - July 26, 1996, U.N. Doc. 
A51/10 22 ¶ 16-19 (1996). See also INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, 
supra note 31. 
74. Akayesu English Trial Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 556 (“According to 
the International Law Commission, public incitement is characterized by 
a call for criminal action to a number of individuals in a public place at 
large by such means as the mass media, for example, radio or 
television.”). 
75. Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement), 
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, Judgement, ¶ 122 (Sept. 29, 2014) (“The 
travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Convention confirm[] that ‘public’ 
incitement to genocide pertains to mass communications.”). 
76. Akayesu English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 556. 
77. Id. (“The public element of incitement to commit genocide may be 
better appreciated in light of . . . the place where the incitement 
occurred”). 
78. Id. (“The public element of incitement to commit genocide may be 
better appreciated in light of . . . whether or not assistance was selective 
or limited.”); Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, 
Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 851 (Dec. 1, 2003). Later, judgments explain 
that assistance really means audience. E.g., Augustin Ngirabatware v. 
Prosecutor (Ngirabatware Appeals Judgement), MICT-12-29-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 52 (Dec. 18, 2014) (“When assessing the ‘public’ element of 
the incitement, factors such as . . . whether the audience was selected or 
limited can be taken into account.”). 
79. Prosecutor v. Callixte Kalimanzira (Kalimanzira English Trial 
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, Judgement, ¶ 515 n.554 (June 22, 
2009) (“At the time the Genocide Convention was adopted, the 
delegates specifically agreed to rule out the possibility of including 
private incitement to commit genocide as a crime, thereby underscoring 
their commitment to set aside for punishment only the truly public 
forms of incitement.”). Private incitement to commit genocide is also 
confusingly punishable under complicity. See supra notes 27, 48. 
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“number of persons” (the “number” factor) and the “medium through 
which the message is conveyed” (the “medium” factor).80  
Although the Akayesu trial judgment provided a legal framework, 
it is noticeably devoid of any explanation on how to apply either 
primary factor. Rather, it bluntly found Akayesu’s speech public.81 
Cases after Akayesu provide more insight into how the factors apply 
in hypothetical scenarios.82 
1. Soapbox speeches and clandestine meetings: the primary factors of 
public incitement.  
The Akayesu judgment is the first word on whether incitement to 
commit genocide is public. The case established the two primary 
factors. The first describes the place where the inciting speech is 
enunciated. The place factor appears intuitive, but has two aspects: 
(1) the geographic place where a speaker spoke and; (2) whether a 
type of setting is typically public. The Akayesu judgment pinpoints 
the geographic location where Akayesu inflamed his audience.83 Two 
witnesses indicated that the meeting was held at a crossroads or on a 
 
80. Ngirabatware Appeals Judgement, Case No. MICT-12-29-A, ¶ 52 (“The 
ICTR Appeals Chamber has held that ‘the number of persons and the 
medium through which the message is conveyed may be relevant in 
assessing whether the attendance was selected or limited, thereby 
determining whether or not the recipient of the message was the general 
public.’”). 
81. Ostensibly Akayesu’s speech was public because it was in a public place, 
a roadside, and the audience was not select or limited. The Canadian 
Supreme Court case against Léon Mugesera demonstrates similar 
disregard for the public element. Mugesera v. Canada, [2005] S.C.R. 100 
(Can.), para. 94 (“The criminal act requirement for incitement to 
genocide has two elements: the act of incitement must be direct and it 
must be public. . . . The speech was public. We need only consider the 
meaning of the requirement that it be direct.”). 
82. E.g., Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Appeals 
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, Judgement, ¶¶  231–32 (Sept. 
29, 2014) (“The Appeals Chamber considers that, though not required, 
the number of persons and the medium through which the message is 
conveyed may be relevant in assessing whether the attendance was 
selected or limited . . . . The Appeals Chamber observes the Trial 
Chamber’s consideration that: (i) the audience consisted of 
approximately 20 members of the general population, including Tutsis, 
who happened to be present in the area at the time; and (ii) the 
incitement occurred in an undeniably public location.”). 
83. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Akayesu English Trial Judgement), 
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 359 (Sept. 2, 1998) (“[T]he 
Accused was present in Gishyeshye, during the early hours of 19 April 
1994, that he joined the crowd gathered around the body of a young 
member of the Interahamwe militia, and that he took that opportunity 
to address the people.”). 
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street.84 Still, the court never formally held that the speech was 
enunciated on a road, and that roads are public places.85 Instead, 
Chamber I wrote that a place is public when it is public by 
definition.86 Yet the ICTR never explained what “public by 
definition” means. It only referred to civil law jurisprudence on public 
places, specifically an obscure criminal judgment issued by the French 
Court of Cassation from 1950.87 Without a modern articulation of 
places that are public by definition the court’s logic seems circular. 
The ILC’s second definition extends the place factor by incorporating 
“mass media.”88 This is relevant, except it relates more closely under 
the modern framework to the second factor: whether an audience is 
select or limited.89 
In English translations, the ICTR articulates the select or limited 
factor in several ways.90 Original French ICTR judgments, deciding a 
 
84. Id. at ¶ 321 (“Prosecution witness A testified that . . . he went to 
Gishyeshye on 19 April 1994, towards 6 or 7 o’clock in the morning, 
where he found a large gathering of 300 to 400 people at a crossroads.”). 
Id. at ¶ 323 (“[A Witness] confirmed that a meeting was then held on 
the road in Gishyeshye, in the presence of [Akayesu]”). 
85. Id. at ¶¶ 358–62, 549–562, 672–675. 
86. Id. at ¶ 556 (“A line of authority commonly followed in Civil law 
systems would regard words as being public where they were spoken 
aloud in a place that were public by definition.”). 
87. Id. at n.125 (“French Court of Cassation, Criminal Tribunal, 2 February 
1950, Bull, crim. No. 38, p. 61.”). 
88. Akayesu English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at ¶ 556 
(“According to the International Law Commission, public incitement is 
characterized by a call for criminal action to a number of individuals in 
a public place at large by such means as the mass media, for example, 
radio or television.”). 
89. Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement), 
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, Judgement, ¶ 231 (Sept. 29, 2014) 
(“[T]hough not required, . . . the medium through which the message is 
conveyed may be relevant in assessing whether the attendance was 
select or limited, thereby determining whether or not the recipient of the 
message was the general public.”). 
90. See Akayesu English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 
Judgement, ¶ 556 (Sept. 2, 1998) (whether “assistance was selective or 
limited”) (emphasis added); Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu (Ruggiu 
English Judgement), Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, 
¶ 17 (June 1, 2000) (whether “incitement was selective or limited”); 
Prosecutor v. Callixte Kalimanzira (Kalimanzira English Trial 
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, Judgement, ¶ 515 (June 22, 2009) 
(whether “attendance was selective or limited.”) (emphasis added); 
Augustin Ngirabatware v. Prosecutor (Ngirabatware Appeals 
Judgement), Case No. MICT-12-29-A, Judgement, ¶ 52 (Dec. 18, 2014) 
(whether the “audience was select or limited.”) (emphasis added). 
Assistance is less precise than audience because it may apply to a 
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charge of incitement to commit genocide, consistently use the French 
word assistance.91 Translation, from French to English, probably 
obscured the meaning of this factor in subsequent decisions. In the 
English Akayesu judgment, the ICTR introduced the “select and 
limited factor” as whether “assistance” is select or limited to the 
inciting speech.92 The English judgment translated assistance, which 
means audience or attendance in French, to “assistance” in English.93 
Later judgments adopted the more lucid translation “audience.”94 No 
ICTR trial chamber or appeal chamber discussed how to apply the 
select or limited factor until the Nahimana Appeal Chamber acquitted 
defendant Barayagwiza, in 2007.95 
The ICTR developed the select and limited factor more 
thoroughly in the case of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza. The Appeals 
Chamber reversed Barayagwiza’s conviction for incitement on the 
basis that the audience was select and limited.96 His incitement 
 
speaker’s subordinates, which cannot be considered in finding a ruling 
public. See supra note 78. 
91. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Akayesu French Trial 
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Jugement, ¶ 556 (Sept. 2, 1998) 
(“assistance a été ou non sélectionée ou limitée”); Prosecutor v. Georges 
Ruggiu (Ruggiu French Trial Judgement), Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, 
Jugement, ¶ 17 (June 1, 2000) (“l’incitation a été ou non sélectionée ou 
limitée”); Prosecutor v. Callixte Kalimanzira (Kalimanzira French Trial 
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, Jugement, ¶ 515 (June 22, 2009) 
(“l’assistance était ou non sélectionée ou limitée”). 
92. Akayesu English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 556. 
93. Compare id. at ¶ 556 (“whether or not assistance was selective or 
limited.”) with Akayesu French Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-
T, ¶ 556 (“assistance a été ou non sélectionée ou limitée”). 
94. E.g., Ngirabatware Appeals Judgement, Case No. MICT-12-29-A, ¶ 52 
(“When assessing the ‘public’ element of the incitement, factors such as 
the place where the incitement occurred and whether the audience was 
selected or limited can be taken into account.”). 
95. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was joined in the Nahimana case. Prosecutor v. 
Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze (Nahimana Trial Judgement), Case No. 
ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003); Nahimana, 
Barayagwiza, Ngeze v. Prosecutor (Nahimana Appeals Judgement), Case 
No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement (Nov. 28, 2007). This case has been 
called “the most contentious of all the ICTR’s judgments.” Wilson, 
supra note 2, at 295. Alexander Zahar, legal officer at the ICTY, calls it 
a “very poor precedent.” Alexander Zahar, The ICTR’s “Media” 
Judgment and the Reinvention of Direct and Public Incitement to 
Commit Genocide, 16 CRIM. L. F. 33 (2005) (“The ICTR’s ‘Media’ 
judgment marks a low point in international criminal justice, where the 
quality of decisions has fluctuated considerably.”). 
96. Nahimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, ¶ 862 (“In 
particular, the supervision of roadblocks cannot form the basis for the 
Appellant’s conviction for direct and public incitement to commit 
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acquittal opened a new vein of arguments pertaining to the public 
element.97 One alleges that a roadblock is per se private.98 A second 
suggests that speech is not public until an audience exceeds a 
minimum number of people.99 Kalimanzira, the former Rwandan 
Interior Minister, won an acquittal, in part, on the second 
argument.100 Judge Fausto Pocar took issue with the majority’s 
reasoning, in a separate opinion.101 He wrote that the decision created 
a dangerous possibility and contended that a group should be 
considered public or private based on its location and 
characteristics.102 An audience need not be large; a small group may 
also be public.103 
In Nzabonimana, the court refined the second factor: whether an 
audience is select or limited. At the so-called Murambi meeting, 
Nzabonimana, an official, endorsed killing Tutsis.104 After the ICTR 
 
genocide; while such supervision could be regarded as instigation to 
commit genocide, it cannot constitute public incitement, since only the 
individuals manning the roadblocks would have been the recipients of 
the message and not the general public.”). 
97. Barayagwiza was a founding member of the Coalition for the Defense of 
the Republic (CDR) a Hutu nationalist party. Nahimana Trial 
Judgement, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, ¶ 7. He was responsible for 
supervising roadblocks in the Rwandan capital, Kigali. Id. at ¶ 707. The 
Appeal Chamber reasoned that “only the individuals manning the 
roadblocks would have been the recipients of the message and not the 
general public.” Nahimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, 
¶ 862. 
98. E.g., Ngirabatware Appeals Judgement, Case No. MICT-12-29-A, ¶ 50 
(“[Ngirabatware] submits that: . . . (ii) the group was selected and 
limited to the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi manning the 
roadblock.”). 
99. E.g., Id. (“[Ngirabatware] submit[ed] that: (i) the mere presence of a 
group at the vicinity of the roadblock does not suffice to show that the 
alleged inciting statements were received by the public as, at best, the 
statements were heard by only three persons”). 
100. Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Appeals 
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 152, 165 (Oct. 20, 
2010) (“Kalimanzira asserts that the Tribunal’s jurisprudence requires a 
very large number of individuals to be exposed to a call to commit 
genocide before it can be qualified as direct and public incitement.”). 
101. Id. at, ¶¶ 41–45 (Pocar, J., dissenting). 
102. Id. at ¶ 45 (“In my view, [requiring an audience to be broad] establishes 
a dangerous and incorrect precedent linked with the question of what 
minimum audience size is required to satisfy the “public” element of the 
crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide.”). 
103. Id. 
104. Nine days after the start of the genocide, Nzabonimana attended the 
Murambi meeting with other Rwandan officials including interim Prime 
Minister Jean Kambanda. Prosecutor v. Callixte Nzabonimana 
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convicted him, Nzabonimana argued, on appeal, that his speech was 
private, based on the characteristics of his audience. He argued that 
the group was select and limited because the audience was composed 
of political officials.105 The Appeal Chamber distinctly agreed.106 In its 
decision, on the Murambi meeting, the ICTR explained the select or 
limited factor using two subordinate factors. It also implied that 
inciting speech may be private, even if it occurs in a public place, 
when the audience is private. 
2. Tipping points and television: subordinate factors of public incitement. 
The Kalimanzira Appeal Judgment was the first to attempt to 
pin down an analysis of the select and limited factor through 
subordinate factors. The two subordinate factors it articulated are (1) 
the number of people in an audience and (2) the medium of the 
speech.107 In an extensive footnote, numbered 410, the Appeal 
Chamber considered both factors, but focused on the size of audiences 
 
(Nzabonimana Trial Judgement), Case No. ICTR-98-44D-T, Judgement 
and Sentence, ¶ 1769 (May 31, 2012) (“On 18 April 1994, the Prime 
Minister of Rwanda and other members of the Interim Government, 
including Nzabonimana, held a meeting for the bourgmestres of 
Gitarama préfecture. Nzabonimana ordered the killings of bourgmestres 
and other local officials opposed to the massacre of Tutsis during the 
meeting.”). At the Murambi meeting, Nzabonimana ordered people who 
opposed massacring Tutsis, killed. Id. at ¶¶ 1769, 1772 (Nzabonimana 
made an “explicit threat to kill persons opposing the massacre of 
Tutsis.”). 
105. Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement), 
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, Judgement, ¶ 380 (Sept. 29, 2014) 
(“Nzabonimana replies that the fact that public officials were convened 
in their function as public officials excludes the characterisation of the 
meeting as public. . . . these officials were selected and convened in their 
official capacity and . . . the meeting was purely private. He further 
replies that the meeting was held in a closed room devoid of any public 
character.”). 
106. The Trial Chamber held that Nzabonimana’s speech was public because 
“the message of the meeting was intended to be broadcast to the public 
at large and evinces that Nzabonimana had the requisite mens rea to 
incite genocide publicly.” Nzabonimana Trial Judgement, Case No. 
ICTR98-44D-T, ¶ 1772. The Appeal Chamber reversed his conviction. 
Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, ¶ 385 
(“the Appeals Chamber notes the Trial Chamber’s acknowledgement 
that the incriminating message was not disseminated by the media. 
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that the evidence does 
not support a finding that the meeting occurred in a public place.”). 
107. Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, ¶¶ 231, 
384 (“though not required, the number of persons and the medium 
through which the message is conveyed may be relevant in assessing 
whether the attendance was selected or limited, thereby determining 
whether or not the recipient of the message was the general public.”). 
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in prior incitement convictions.108 Footnote 410 also referred to three 
cases to quantify the size of a typically public audience.109 The Court 
found audiences, where a defendant’s speech was deemed public, 
ranged from “over 100” to “approximately 5,000 individuals.”110 While 
messages that reach 5,000 or more people are generally public, 
audiences comprised of individuals fewer than one hundred are harder 
to label without more facts. 
A factual scenario in the Nyiramasuhuko trial judgment indicates 
that when an audience is composed of a single member of the public, 
inciting speech is unlikely to be held public.111 In the Butare case, 
which joined six defendants, Trial Chamber II found Paulene 
Nyiramasuhuko not guilty of incitement to commit genocide.112 
Nyiramasuhuko, the former Rwandan Minister of the Family and 
Women’s development, allegedly distributed condoms to a civilian 
woman, in the presence of four men, directing her to “[g]o and 
distribute these condoms to [her] young men, so that they use them to 
rape Tutsi women and protect themselves from AIDS, and after 
having raped them they should kill all of them. Let no Tutsi woman 
survive because they take away our husbands.”113 Chamber II found 
that the public element was not satisfied, based in large part on the 
number of individuals present.114 It further indicated that the 
communication was comparable to a private conversation.115 Based on 
Nyriamasuhuko and Kalimanzira alone, it appears that there is a 
magic tipping point between zero and one hundred audience members 
where public speech becomes private and vice versa. 
 
108. Id. at n.410. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. (“[I]nciting speeches at public meetings to “crowds” of people – 
ranging from “over 100” to approximately 5,000 individuals - were found 
to constitute public incitement.”). 
111. Nyiramasuhuko Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, ¶ 6016. 
112. Butare is a region in Rwanda that the case is colloquially called. The 
case is officially named Nyirmasuhuko. Id. at ¶ 6186. 
113. Id. at ¶¶ 6014, 6016 (“The evidence shows that Nyiramasuhuko directed 
her speech to one woman, in the presence of four other men.”). 
114. Id. at ¶ 6016 (“the Chamber is not satisfied that the “public” element of 
this crime has been established.”). 
115. Id. (“In order to possess the requisite mens rea for the crime of direct 
and public incitement, the audience must be much broader than that 
found in the present circumstance. Here, Nyiramasuhuko’s statements 
are more akin to a ‘conversation’, consistent with the definition of 
private incitement found in the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide 
Convention. There is no indication in the record that anyone other than 
those cited was present.”). 
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This magic number is the very notion which Judge Pocar took 
issue with in his separate opinion to Kalimanzira.116 He asserted that 
there should be no threshold. Furthermore, the number of individuals 
should not be dispositive of whether or not the speech was public.117 
The Nzabonimana Appeal Chamber affirmed Judge Pocar’s reasoning 
less than four years later, finding that numbers may be probative but 
are not required in an analysis of the public element.118 In other 
words, the number of individuals present is a factor; it is not an 
element.119 
Nzabonimana is a second example of a case where a court 
prominently weighed the amount of individuals in an audience of less 
than 100 members. In relation to the Cyayi centre, Nzabonimana was 
initially convicted for direct and public incitement to commit genocide 
when he addressed 30 individuals approximately 250 to 300 meters 
from a government office.120 The Appeals Chamber accepted the trial 
courts finding that Nzabonimana’s speech to a group, at a 
government office, including a Tutsi, and an individual that was 
called over, was public.121 The Trial Chamber found that the audience 
 
116. Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Appeals 
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Separate Opinion of Judge Pocar, 
¶¶ 41–45 (Oct. 20, 2010). 
117. Id. at ¶¶ 45, 156 (Pocar, J., dissenting) (“I believe, no threshold exists 
and none should be established. There is no clear indication in the 
jurisprudence of the Tribunal that a speech must be made to a large 
group of people in order to qualify as public incitement.”). Id. at 45 
(“There is no clear indication in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal that a 
speech must be made to a large group of people in order to qualify as 
public incitement. For the purpose of the law, it suffices that the speech 
was directed at a number of individuals at a public place or at members 
of the general public”). 
118. Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement), 
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, Judgment, ¶ 231 (Sept. 29, 2014) (“Though 
not required, the number of persons . . . may be relevant in assessing 
whether the attendance was select or limited, thereby determining 
whether or not the recipient of the message was the general public.”); 
see also id. at ¶ 126 (“The number of individuals in the audience is not 
an element of the crime of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide.”).  
119. Id. at ¶ 231 (“[T]he number of persons present is not an essential factor 
in this assessment.”). 
120. Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Trial Judgement), 
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 887 (May 31, 
2012). 
121. Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, ¶ 129 
(“[T]he Appeals Chamber observes that in this specific instance, the 
facts used by the Trial Chamber to establish the public element – the 
public location, a crowd of approximately 30 people, and audience that 
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was composed of 30 people, refining the requisite composition of small 
public groups, beyond simply a 100-person threshold. This appeal 
judgment permits audiences to be small, yet still public. 
The second subordinate factor is the “medium through which the 
message is conveyed.”122 The drafters specified that messages 
broadcast in the press, over the radio, or in the cinema constitute 
incitement.123 This notion was a prominent consideration in the 
travaux préparatoires.124 ICTR cases confirm that individuals will be 
liable for messages through these media. In one case, the Interim 
Prime Minister of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda was convicted for 
incitement to commit genocide, based on a video recording of a speech 
he delivered that was broadcast during the genocide.125 In another, a 
Belgian social worker and radio personality for Radio Television Libre 
de Milles Collines (Radio RTLM) pled guilty to incitement to commit 
genocide. His speech was found public because his “messages were 
broadcast in a media forum and to members of the general public.”126 
The medium factor plays a role in decisions where speech that 
normally appears public is found to be private. When a speech is 
recorded in a private place, it may be found public only if it is 
broadcast or disseminated. An issue in the Nzabonimana appeal 
judgment, about the Murambi meeting, demonstrates how this idea 
applies. Although the Trial Judgment noted the presence of a 
journalist and convicted Nzabonimana, the Appeal Chamber found 
the conviction an error.127 Instead, it held that the discussion was not 
 
was not selected or limited – showed that the incitement was public and 
that Nzabonimana intended it to be so.”). 
122. Id. at ¶ 231 (“[T]hough not required, . . . the medium through which 
the message is conveyed may be relevant in assessing whether the 
attendance was selected or limited, thereby determining whether or not 
the recipient of the message was the general public.”). 
123. Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Appeals 
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement, ¶ 158 (Oct. 20, 2010) 
(“the Appeals Chamber recalls that the language of Article 2 of the 
Tribunal’s Statute tracks the language of the Genocide Convention. A 
review of the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention 
confirms that public incitement to genocide pertains to mass 
communications. . . . understood as incitement ‘in public speeches or in 
the press, through the radio, the cinema or other ways of reaching the 
public.’”). See also ABTAHI, supra note 43, at 986. 
124. Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, ¶ 126. 
125. Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case No. ICTR97-23-S, Judgement and 
Sentence, ¶ 39(x) (Sept. 4, 1998). 
126. Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu (Ruggiu English Judgement), Case No. 
ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 17 (June 1, 2000). 
127. Nzabonima Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR98-44D-A, ¶¶ 382–383. 
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public because the journalist never disseminated the message.128 The 
Chamber drew a line in the sand designating that a private 
conversation only becomes public once it is broadcast.129 
C. Summary of the Modern Legal Framework 
The modern legal framework is composed of primary and 
subordinate factors. A Trial Chamber should begin an analysis of the 
public element by considering the primary factors. First, it should 
examine the characteristics of the place where the speech was 
pronounced. If the location is a street corner, then the place is likely 
to be considered public. If the location is a closed room, then the 
place is likely to be private. Once it determines if the place is by 
definition public, it should move on to the select or limited factor. 
This primary factor incorporates the subordinate factors. It relies on a 
determination of the nature of an audience privy to inciting speech.  
There is no predetermined progression for considering the 
subordinate factors. A court may begin by evaluating how many 
individuals were present and composed the audience. The court may 
use audience size as one indicator to determine that speech is public. 
Audiences consisting of many individuals are more likely to be public, 
but small speeches do not necessarily point to a private conversation. 
Given the existing jurisprudence, it would be erroneous for a 
judgment to find that a speech is private based solely on the presence 
of a small number of individuals. A court should also consider 
whether the speech was broadcast through the media. If speech is 
broadcast it is likely to be public. However, if speech is not broadcast 
and the audience is small, judges should consider unspecified 
characteristics of an audience to determine whether it is public. 
II. Suggestions to Clarify the Public Element 
Instead of a factor, the select and limited character of an audience 
should be a defense. Only defendants have ever raised the argument 
and in many cases a judgment can be rendered without considering 
the character of an audience. This would also shift the burden to 
 
128. Id. at ¶¶ 385–87 (“[T]he Appeals Chamber finds that the attendance at 
the Murambi meeting was selected and limited, that the location was 
not a public place, and that the incriminating message was not 
broadcasted. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that no reasonable 
trier of fact could have found that the incitement was public.”). 
129. Id. at ¶ 385 (“The Appeals Chamber considers that the mere presence 
of a journalist does not automatically render the meeting public, rather 
it is the broadcast of the incriminating message which would render the 
incitement public. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes the Trial 
Chamber’s acknowledgement that the incriminating message was not 
disseminated by the media.”). 
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defendants, which is appropriate, as they are in a better position to 
shed light on facts relating to the composition of an audience. 
Another method to clarify the public element is to designate the 
medium and place factors as “or” factors. Both medium and place 
should satisfy the public element independently. Media is more 
appropriately considered at the first stage of the public element 
framework. This recommendation seeks to separate the medium of 
speech from the place factor and the select and limited defense by 
eliminating any connection to the number of individuals in an 
audience. Instead it relies on the broadcast qualities of media.  
A. The Select or Limited Factor as a True Affirmative Defense 
The select and limited factor is more appropriately considered a 
defense to public incitement than a factor. It allows a Chamber to 
hold that a meeting was private, absolving a defendant of an 
incitement allegation. Relying on the characteristics of an audience, 
the defense recalls early debates on what crimes of genocide were 
punishable under international law. The select and limited defense 
should override both the place and medium factors requiring a court 
to rule on the composition of an audience. 
One consistent consideration in deciding whether an audience is 
select or limited is the number of audience members. This is not 
necessary, but may be helpful, to find an audience select or limited.130 
It may be an indicator because it helps judges gauge the context of a 
speech. Though it is difficult to empirically prove an amount of 
audience members, the number may capture the character of 
communications and the relationship between the speaker and the 
audience.  
The second factor, medium of speech, appears to conflate 
characteristics of a communication with the amount of audience 
members. A more precise inquiry would consider the relationship 
between the speaker and his or her audience. In early conversations 
on the public element the U.N. Secretariat acknowledged that 
communications between superiors and subordinates were not public 
speech. Instead of using medium as a way to emphasize the scope of 
an audience (i.e. speech that is communicated through the television 
reaches large audiences) an analysis could rely on a factor that 
considers the relationship between the speaker and any person in his 
or her audience. 
The number factor may inappropriately exclude speeches that 
target a small group of public individuals. If, hypothetically, a speaker 
 
130. Id. at ¶¶ 231, 384 (“though not required, the number of persons and the 
medium through which the message is conveyed may be relevant in 
assessing whether the attendance was selected or limited, thereby 
determining whether or not the recipient of the message was the general 
public.”). 
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holds a meeting in a room with twelve members of the public, the 
relationship between the speaker and audience members is crucial to 
determine whether the conversation should be public or private. If all 
twelve individuals are members of the public then the meeting may be 
found public. However, if the twelve audience members are the 
speaker’s subordinates then the meeting may not be found public. 
The juxtaposition between the number of individuals present and the 
relationship is key. These two factors, much more than number and 
medium, align in situations that are typically public and diverge in 
more complex factual scenarios. 
B. Refine the Definition of a Public Place 
Place is a factor in every ICTR case involving the public element. 
It allows judges to swiftly pinpoint a location of incitement, explain 
the setting’s qualities, and label it inherently public or private. A 
crossroads is one example of a place commonly considered public.131 A 
commercial center is a second.132 On the other hand, an isolated room 
should be considered private. The ICTR’s definition seeks to 
incorporate these scenarios, but relies on civil law definitions.133 The 
Akayesu judgment alludes directly to the French legal theory,134 but 
Trial Chamber I never established which places are public by 
definition. That introduces a lacuna into the jurisprudence. 
Articulating a method for deciding whether places are public or 
private would alleviate that ambiguity.  
American public accommodations laws may be one helpful way to 
delineate a method for distinguishing public and private places.135 
 
131. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Akayesu English Trial Judgement), 
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 323 (Sept. 2, 1998) (“[A Witness] 
confirmed that a meeting was then held on the road in Gishyeshye, in 
the presence of [Akayesu]”); id. at ¶ 674 (“From the foregoing, the 
Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, by the above-
mentioned speeches made in public and in a public place, Akayesu had 
the intent to directly create a particular state of mind in his audience 
necessary to lead to the destruction of the Tutsi group, as such.”). 
132. Prosecutor v. Callixte Nzabonimana (Nzabonimana Trial Judgement), 
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 1760 
(“Nzabonimana’s speech was given in an undeniably public location to 
twenty members of the general population, including Tutsis, who 
happened to be present in [Butare Trading Centre] at the time of his 
arrival.”). 
133. Akayesu English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 556 (“A 
line of authority commonly followed in Civil law systems would regard 
words as being public where they were spoken aloud in a place that 
were public by definition.”). 
134. Id. at n.125 
135. American legal theories on publicness such as copyright law may 
additionally help clarify the definition of public places. See Julie E. 
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Both the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) contain provisions on public accommodations.136 These Acts 
characterize public accommodations by anchoring the term “public” 
in interstate commerce.137 Though this concept is grounded in the 
American Commerce Clause, the goal is similarly to identify public 
places and exclude places that are private. The Civil Rights Act of 
1964 defines a place as a public accommodation “if its operations 
affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported 
by State action.”138 The Americans with Disabilities Act distinguishes 
public and private “entities.”139 Section 12131(1) defines public 
entities as “any State or local government; any department, agency, 
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States 
or local government; and the National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation.”140 Public accommodations could be characterized based 
on their affiliation with government functions, such as roads and 
government offices, or private entities, such as a room within a store 
or restaurant. 
An alternative, but unfavorable, approach would be to eliminate 
the public factor altogether.141 A judgment could theoretically rely on 
the character of an audience without ever considering the place where 
a speech was made. This approach is disadvantageous as supported by 
all ICTR incitement cases, because it leads to lengthy and 
complicated reasoning, even in straightforward factual scenarios. As a 
result, judgments would become less predictable. In international 
 
Cohen, Comment: Copyright’s Private Public Distinction, 55 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 963 (2005) for a discussion of the public-private distinction 
in copyright. 
136. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012); Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2012). 
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (“Establishments affecting interstate commerce or 
supported in their activities by State action as places of public 
accommodation”). 
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b). 
139. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6) (“The term ‘private entity’ means any entity other 
than a public entity”). 
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). 
141. See also Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khaled Ghanayim, Incitement, Not 
Sedition, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY 
147, 160 (2000) (“The determining criterion for incitement is anchored 
to the concrete circumstances of the behaviour and the non-specificity of 
the incitees, not the location of the occurrence. The location as such is 
irrelevant, and thus the criterion for defining the term ‘public’ should 
not include the location of the incitement.”). This method also parallels 
the term “publication” in American defamation law, defined as “the 
communication of defamatory words to someone other than the person 
defamed.” Black’s Law Dictionary 611 (4th pocket ed. 1996). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016) 
Public Enemy 
443 
criminal cases, where a judgment may be thousands of pages long, 
retaining but redefining the place factor balances effectiveness with 
efficiency. 
C. Elevate the Medium Factor from a Subordinate to a Primary Factor 
Though it acts as a subordinate factor in recent ICTR cases,142 the 
medium factor interacts with the place factor beyond its present role 
under the select and limited factor. Medium is an alternate way to 
evaluate whether speech is public. If the select and limited defense 
relies on the number of individuals in an audience and the 
relationship between a speaker and his or her audience members, then 
the medium factor is free to play a more expansive role in the legal 
framework.143 For instance, the place factor is only relevant when a 
location can be identified. If a defendant records a speech, and a court 
cannot ascertain facts about where it was recorded or where an 
audience perceived it, then location is impossible to determine. 
Medium can step in and describe an abstract place where that speech 
exists. If the speech exists in a broadcast medium, or if the place is 
public, then incitement should be public. The medium factor is 
properly weighed against the place factor as an “or” factor because it 
has the potential to describe place when a physical description is 
elusive. 
The threshold question regarding medium is whether a statement 
or speech was broadcast. In Nzabonimana, the Appeal Chamber ruled 
that if speech is otherwise private, it is not public until it is 
broadcast. If speech is transferred into a recorded medium but is 
never broadcast, then the factor is not satisfied.144 However, it is 
incorrect to assume that broadcasted messages are public merely 
because they reach a larger audience. Instead, broadcasted messages 
are public because they have been disseminated to individual citizens.  
Finally, medium can stand in for the place factor when a place 
analysis is misleading. For example, if someone utters a statement in 
 
142. See supra Section II.B.2. 
143. This is appropriate because the Genocide Convention drafters 
emphasized the significance of criminalizing broadcasted speech. 
Prosecutor v. Callixte Nzabonimana (Nzabonimana Trial Judgement), 
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 1754 (May 31, 
2012) (“the Appeals Chamber has taken into account the travaux 
préparatoires of the Genocide Convention, which confirm that “public” 
incitement to genocide pertains to mass communications.”). 
144. The Nzabonimana Appeal Court found speech private although a 
journalist was present to record the speech for dissemination. Callixte 
Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement), Case 
No. ICTR-98-44D-A, Judgement, ¶ 385 (Sept. 29, 2014) (“[T]he mere 
presence of a journalist does not automatically render a meeting public, 
rather it is the broadcast of the incriminating message which would 
render the incitement public.”). 
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a private place, then broadcasts it over the radio into thousands of 
homes, the place factor improperly indicates that the location is 
private. In this scenario every relevant location is private, but the 
speech still effectively reaches the public. Therefore it should be 
public. Medium still indicates that the inciting speech is public, 
because it was broadcast on television. Preserving the place factor and 
matching it alongside the medium factor seeks to simplify inquiries 
into the public element without sacrificing complexity. 
III. The Future of Public Incitement to Commit 
Genocide 
Future genocidaires will likely have access to email and social 
media. These tools will help them contact an exponentially larger and 
more geographically diverse audience.145 This could cause the public-
private distinction to grow increasingly technical.146 Terrorists already 
use social media to target distant recruits, and sympathizers already 
spread support online.147 For example, in autumn 2014, Islamic State 
 
145. Peter Beinart, What Does Obama Really Mean by ‘Violent Extremism’?, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 20, 2015, 12:06 PM), available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/obama-
violent-extremism-radical-islam/385700/ [http://perma.cc/9MQ4-5DKC] 
(“terrorism, . . . is available to people of all ideological stripes and which 
grows more dangerous as technology empowers individuals or groups to 
kill far more people far more quickly than they could have in ages 
past.”). 
146. CRYER, supra note 26, at 316 (“The internet and e-mail may raise 
interesting questions over the ‘public’ requirement.”). 
147. Thomas Tracy, ISIS has mastered social media, recruiting ‘lone wolf’ 
attacks to target Times Square: Bratton, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/isis-recruiting-lone-wolf-
terrorists-target-times-square-bratton-article-1.1941687 
[http://perma.cc/K68B-86LR] (“[ISIS] the terror group responsible for 
the videotaped executions of two American journalists and a British aid 
worker are calling for ‘lone wolf’ attacks on Times Square.”). Kathy 
Gilsinan, Is ISIS’s Social-Media Power Exaggerated?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 
23, 2015, 7:05 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/is-isiss-
social-media-power-exaggerated/385726/ [http://perma.cc/847B-2EPP] 
(“The high-quality videos, the online magazines, the use of social media, 
terrorist Twitter accounts—it’s all designed to target today’s young 
people online, in cyberspace.”). Michael Schmidt, Canadian Killed in 
Syria Lives on as Pitchman for Jihadis, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/world/middleeast/isis-uses-andre-
poulin-a-canadian-convert-to-islam-in-recruitment-video.html?_r=0 
[perma.cc/JCN8-QHBH]. Ben Hubbard, Jihadists and Supporters Take 
to Social Media to Praise Attack on Charlie Hebdo, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/world/europe/islamic-
extremists-take-to-social-media-to-praise-charlie-hebdo-attack.html 
[http://perma.cc/CH92-LH5S] (“Within hours of the deadly attack on 
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(IS) supporters operated 46,000 Twitter accounts.148 These accounts 
produce approximately 90,000 messages, through Twitter and other 
social media sites, a day.149 Some even hijack hashtags to draw 
attention on social networking sites.150 Government officials, alerted 
by these and other past communications, warn that attacks incited by 
social media are plausible in western countries.151 So, it is possible by 
extension that these communications could develop into calls capable 
of inciting genocide. 
The distinction between public and private genocide is especially 
pertinent to new mediums of mass communication. Twitter and 
Facebook present complicated questions because they combine 
features of private conversations with public broadcasts. Any user 
may send a Facebook message to thousands of individuals. One 
method to address the public element in this context is to designate 
 
the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, Islamic extremists and 
their supporters were praising the killings and lauding the attackers on 
social media”). 
148. J.M. Berger & Jonathon Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining 
and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter 7 (2015) 
(“During the period of October 4 through November 27, 2014, we 
estimate there were no fewer than 46,000 Twitter accounts supporting 
ISIS. . . . We estimate that a minimum of 30,000 of these are accurately 
described as accounts belonging to ISIS supporters and controlled by a 
human user, using the most conservative criteria.”). 
149. Eric Schmitt, U.S. Intensifies Effort to Blunt ISIS’ Messages, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/world/middleeast/us-intensifies-
effort-to-blunt-isis-message.html  [http://perma.cc/9SA2-B3CU] (“With 
the Islamic State and its supporters producing as many as 90,000 tweets 
and other social media responses every day”). 
150. Uri Friedman, An American in ISIS’s Retweet Army, ATLANTIC (Aug. 
29, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/an-
american-in-isis-retweet-army/379208/ [http://perma.cc/K3WX-SQM8] 
(“On Twitter and Instagram, [ISIS] hijacks trending hashtags on topics 
ranging from British soccer to California earthquakes to disseminate its 
messages.”). The Oxford English Dictionary defines “hashtag” as “(on 
social media websites and applications) a word or phrase preceded by a 
hash and used to identify messages relating to a specific topic[.]” Oxford 
English Dictionary (online ed. 2015). 
151. Scott Neuman, Homeland Security Chief: Threat to U.S. Malls ‘A New 
Phase’ For Terrorists, NPR (Feb. 22, 2015, 12:28 PM), available at 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2015/02/22/388242488/homeland-security-chief-threat-to-u-s-malls-
a-new-phase-for-terrorists [http://perma.cc/25QM-NBR5] (“Johnson 
said a video released by the Somali-based group al-Shabab ‘reflects [a] 
new phase’ in which terrorist networks publicly call ‘for independent 
actors in their homelands to carry out attacks.’”). 
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virtual platforms public or private. For that reason, public 
accommodations laws are particularly relevant.  
As of April 2015, there is a circuit split in the United States over 
whether private websites are subject to public accommodations 
accessibility requirements under the ADA.152 In an advance notice of 
potential rulemaking, the Department of Justice stated that some 
websites on the Internet should be considered public places, but the 
entire Internet should not.153 Using the ADA public accommodation 
theory would seek to determine whether virtual speech is located in a 
public place. An account accessible to the public should be public. A 
message restricted to a small group of viewers, or only accessible by 
using a password should not be public.  
Establishing a method for distinguishing public and private places 
would also help describe virtual forms of speech. For example, a 
website would be a public place, but a member-restricted website 
would be a private place. Similarly, Facebook and Twitter would 
incorporate the second suggestion that broadcast speech satisfies the 
medium factor. A tweet, broadcast to the entire Internet community, 
would be public. A comment posted to a Facebook user’s wall would 
be public, but private messages that are not broadcast to other users 
on Facebook would be private. The select and limited defense may 
even play a role in determining whether an email listserv is select or 
limited, based on the number of recipients and their relationship to 
the writer. Once speech is filtered through a medium that can be 
accessed without limitation, it is broadcast. 
IV. Conclusion 
The public element is more complicated than it appears. It recalls 
the IMT at Nuremburg and captures an example of how the ICTR 
 
152. Trevor Crowley, Note, Wheelchair Ramps in Cyberspace: Bringing the 
Americans with Disabilities Act into the 21st Century, 2013 BYU L. 
REV. 651 (2013) (“Some circuit courts interpret ‘place of public 
accommodation’ broadly to include nonphysical places, while other 
circuit courts interpret this provision narrowly to require a physical 
tangible facility—putting virtual places like websites outside of Title III 
coverage.”). 
153. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web 
Information and Services of State and Local Government Entities and 
Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43460 (proposed July 26, 2010), 
available at http://www.ada.gov/anprm2010/web%20anprm_2010.htm 
[http://perma.cc/89VL-K2BN] (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 
36) (“The Department has also repeatedly affirmed the application of 
title III to websites of public accommodations. . . . Although some 
litigants have asserted that ‘the Internet’ itself should be considered a 
place of public accommodation, the Department does not address this 
issue here.”). 
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has impacted international criminal law.154 The element has, at times, 
led to acquittals and reduced sentences.155 Although the ICTR 
adopted factors in 1998, it is still having some trouble efficiently 
applying them. The ICC will be the next international body with 
power to apply and develop international criminal law on direct and 
public incitement.156 It is also possible that the ICC will decide to 
impose the crime by drafting entirely new jurisprudence.157 
Although the Rome Statute includes direct and public incitement 
to commit genocide, along with other forms of individual 
responsibility, it is generally accepted that Article 25(3)(e) “direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide” is consistent with earlier 
formulations of incitement to genocide.158 This wrinkle has the 
 
154. See supra Parts I.A and I.B. 
155. See supra note 27. 
156. Rome Statute, art. 25(e) (Article 25(e) of the Rome Statute provides 
that the International Criminal Court may hold a defendant “liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that 
person . . . directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide.”). 
Domestic trials may prove helpful in learning about public incitement to 
commit genocide in the future. See HJ Van Der Merwe, The 
Prosecution of Incitement to Genocide in South Africa, 16 
POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L.J. 327, 329 (2013) (“although incitement to 
genocide is now also criminalised in many domestic legal systems, the 
prosecution thereof is almost without precedent on the domestic level. . . 
. [I]n general international criminal justice, and in particular the Rome 
Statute, place the primary responsibility for prosecuting international 
crime on domestic legal systems.”). One example is the case of Yvonne 
Basebya who was convicted of incitement to commit genocide in the 
Netherlands, in 2013. Rb. 1 maart 2013, JOR 2013, 8710 m.nt EVS 
(Basebya/Neth.) (Neth.) available at 
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI%3ANL%3A
RBDHA%3A2013%3A8710 [http://perma.cc/8RJE-LZSY]. The 
International Court of Justices may provide another opportunity for 
developing incitement and the public element as in the recent case on 
incitement between Croatia and Serbia. Application of the Convention 
on the prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. 
Serbia), Judgment (Feb. 3, 2015), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/118/18422.pdf [http://perma.cc/6VB7-RT2G] 
(acquitting Croatia of any allegations of incitement to commit 
genocide). 
157. Thomas Davies, as a student, argued that incitement, in the Rome 
Statute, is no longer an inchoate crime. Rather, it is a form of individual 
criminal responsibility for convicting an individual of genocide.  See 
Davies, supra note 7, at 245 (“[T]he full effectiveness of the 
criminalization of incitement is threatened by the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which reduces the status of incitement 
from a crime in its own right to a mode of criminal participation in 
genocide.”).  
158. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 25 (titled “Individual Criminal 
Responsibility”). Gerhard Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in 
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potential to complicate incitement jurisprudence, but, for the time 
being, scholars continue to consider it an inchoate crime.159 It is 
impossible to know precisely how the ICC will evaluate the public 
element, since it has never convicted anyone of incitement to commit 
genocide.160 
If the ICC chooses to adopt the ICTR framework on incitement, 
as it should, it has a wealth of case law, developed over sixty years, to 
draw from, as well as an opportunity to reorganize the public element 
by adopting measures to ease its implementation.161 The element is 
beneficial because it facilitates punishments for inciting speech, while 
indicating when defendants will be held accountable under the law. 
The ICC may also clarify the public element looking towards new 
forms of communication and strategies that mirror communication via 
the Internet. The suggestions in this paper seek to achieve that goal: 
treating the select and limited factor as a defense, and elevating the 
medium factor to primary status alongside and instead of the place 
factor. Under such circumstances, public incitement to genocide would 
 
Article 25 ICC Statute, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 953, 956 (2007) (“While 
Article 25(3)(a) to (d) addresses modes of criminal participation, 
subparagraphs (e) and (f) deal with incitement to genocide and with 
attempt and abandonment; this might be seen as misleading from a 
structural point of view, because neither incitement to genocide nor 
attempt can be classified as modes of participation, but should rather be 
classified as inchoate crimes.”). MICHAIL VAGIAS, THE TERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 155 (2014) 
(“[T]he prevailing view is that [direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide] is also an inchoate crime as regards the Rome Statute, on the 
basis of the relationship of incitement to the other modes of 
responsibility in Article 25(3) and the preparatory works of the 
Statute.”). But see Davies, supra note 7, at 246 (“The Rome Statute, by 
listing incitement as a mode of participation rather than as a crime in 
itself, and by not including incitement in the list of crimes over which 
the ICC has jurisdiction, renders the prohibition on incitement far less 
effective than it has been in the jurisprudence of the ICTR.”). 
159. See VAGIAS, supra note 158, at 155 (“the prevailing view is that 
[incitement to commit genocide] is also an inchoate crime as regards the 
Rome Statute”); SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 325 (“The Rome Statute 
provides for the inchoate crime of direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide, faithfully reflecting the Convention on this point.”). 
160. The ICC has only issued one arrest warrant for genocide, and none for 
incitement to commit genocide. See Sudan: ICC Warrant for Al-Bashir 
on Genocide, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/13/sudan-icc-warrant-al-bashir-
genocide [https://perma.cc/Z4RT-3375]. Al-Bashir’s case was suspended 
in December 2014. Sudan President Bashir Hails ‘Victory’ Over ICC 
Charges, BBC (Dec. 13, 2014) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
30467167 [http://perma.cc/CLJ4-PUCV]. 
161. See supra Section II. 
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remain relevant and prevent inciting speech from contributing to 
genocide in the future. 
 
 
 
